Indictment against JAPAN for
Women*s International War Crimes Tribunal
on Japan*s Military Sexual Slavery
2000
Table of contents
I. HISOTRICAL BACKGROUND TO THE SEXUAL
SLAVERY COMMITTED BY THE JAPANESE
MILITARY
A. Development of the Japanese military*s
system of "comfort women", from its
introduction to its end ..... paras 1- 6
B. Historical background to the system of
"comfort women" ..... paras 7 - 9
II. CHAIN OF COMMAND OF THE JAPANESE
GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY
A. From the first Shanghai Incident in
early 1932 to the outbreak of the
Asia-Pacific War (WW2) in December 1941
..... paras 10 - 13
B. From the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific
War (WW2) to the defeat of Japan
..... para 14
C. During the period of the all-out war
between Japan and China 1937-45 .....
paras 15 -19
III. INDIVIDUAL CHARGES
A. Sexual enslavement of UEDA Yoko and
other Japanese "comfort women" .....
paras 20 -22
B. Sexual enslavement of SAWADA Noriko and
other Japanese "comfort women"
..... paras 23 - 25
C. Sexual enslavement of the women in areas
other than the six victimised
countries or regions represented at the
present Tribunal ..... paras 26 - 33
D. Defendant Hirohito, Emperor Showa
a. his liability for the "Rape of
Nanking" (the mass rape in Nanjing) .....
para 34 - 36
b. his liability for the cases of
"comfort stations" ..... paras 37 - 41
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE STATE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
A. Insufficiency of investigation and
disclosure of the truth ..... paras 42
- 43
B. Non-fulfilment of duties for apology,
reparation or prosecution .....
paras 44 - 46
C. Leaving the PTSD of the victimised
persons grow worse ..... paras 47 - 49
V. FACTUAL GROUND TO THE STATE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
..... paras 50 - 56
VI. CONTENT OF THE STATE RESPONSIBILITY THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS TO FULFIL
..... paras 57 - 61
----
I.
HISOTRICAL BACKGROUND TO THE SEXUAL SLAVERY COMMITTED BY THE JAPANESE
MILITARY
A. Development of the Japanese military*s
system of "comfort women", from its
introduction to its end
1. The First Stage: 1932~First Shanghai
Incident: Introduction of Systematic
Military Sexual Slavery : On January 28,
1932 in Shanghai, acts of aggression
on the part of the Japanese military led to
landing parties of the Japanese
Navy to take the field, and culminated in
an armed conflict against the
Chinese army. In February, Prime Minister
Inukai and his cabinet decided to
dispatch forces of the Army. The presence
of the Japanese military forces
increased to 17,000 including troops
already stationed in Shanghai. At the
time of the first Shanghai Incident,
displeased by the frequency of rape
committed by the Japanese military, OKAMURA
Yasuji, Vice-Chief of the Staff
of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army,
requested that the Governor of Nagasaki
Prefecture [on Japan proper] send a group
of “comfort women”.1 This
information is also verified in the
personal diary of OKABE Naosaburo, Chief
Staff Officer of the same Expeditionary
Army.2 As the army practice of
establishing “comfort stations” was modeled
on that of the navy; it is
thought that the Navy had already had
military "comfort stations” from a
much earlier time.3 As far as we can confirm from existing data,
the
establishment of “comfort stations”by the
Japanese military had begun at
the very latest in 1932. In the same year,
Japan created the puppet state of
Manchukuo in north-eastern China, and
according to official documents, in
1933 there was already a comfort station
(14th mixed brigade, stationed in
Pingquan).4
2. The Second Stage: 1937 - Japan’s all-out
war against China: Full-scale
Operation of the systematic military sexual
slavery : The full-scale
operation of military “comfort stations”
started around the time when Japan
entered the all-out general war against
China after troops clashed at Marco
Polo Bridge on July 7, 1937. When the
Second Shanghai Incident began
on
August 13, the Japanese military was again
expanded and advanced on the
capital of Nanjing [Nanking].5 From around
this time until the fall of
Nanjing on December 13 and for weeks
afterward, rape committed by Japanese
soldiers continued unabated. The military
took this situation seriously and
made an effort to set up new “comfort
stations” and expand already existing
ones. Even after the major operations in
Hankou and Guangdong in the fall of
1938, Chinese resistance continued and the
war in China stagnated. With
Japanese troops being stationed for a long
time in one location, the variety
of “comfort
stations”increased. For instance, some “comfort stations”
made as part of quartermaster sections,
while others were operated by troops
for themselves. In addition, there were
irregular travelling ones and
temporary ones. This makes it difficult to
trace the development of the
system and the reality of sexual slavery
later on.
3. Initially, women from mainland Japan and
Korean women residing in Japan
were recruited and sent to China to be put
in those “comfort stations.”
When demand exceeded the supply, however,
women in the colonies were made
focus of recruitment as well. At that time,
Korea was suffering from poverty
that was brought about by Japanese
colonisation. Poverty forced many of the
Koreans to immigrate to Japan and Northeast
China. Under such harsh
conditions, many girls and young women
"applied" to "job opportunities",
cruelly enticed and deceived by sweet words
(“There are good jobs,”
“You*ll make
good money”), or taken under the power the Government-General
of Korea. In Taiwan, another colonised
territory, not only were Chinese women
recruited, but there are also cases of
women of indigenous ethnicity taken by
low-ranking police officials working under
the auspices of the
Government-General of Taiwan. In China,
recruitment took place in various
forms: women were deceived; powerful locals
were made to supply women; and
prostitutes were forcibly taken away from
local brothels. In many battle
zones where “comfort stations” did not
exist, as in the case of
Yu-prefecture, Shanxi Province, local women
were kidnapped from villages
during counter-guerrilla attacks and taken
to where the troops were
stationed, where they suffered continuous
rape.
4. HARA Zenshirou, Staff Officer with the
Kwantung Army planned to collect
20,000 “comfort women” from the Korean
Peninsula to prepare for the
Kwantung Army Special Exercise in July,
1941. MURAKAMI Sadao (impedimenta
team, 3rd section, the Staff of Kwantung Army), who was took
care of the
clerical matters for the plan, wrote in a
letter to Hara (now owned by SENDA
Kako) that he was only able to collect 3000
women. This was an important
turning point for the military to start
full-scale establishment and full
operation of “comfort stations”.
5. The Third Stage: 1941-1945 or the period
of the Asia-Pacific War or WW2:
On December 8, 1941, Asia-Pacific War
started with the bombing of Pearl
Harbor.
Southern Expeditionary Army and Japanese forces under its wing
established "comfort stations"
one after another throughout the Southeast
Asia and Pacific islands that they
occupied. Around May 1942, when the
operation for Southern Expansion Doctrine
was settled temporarily, Japanese
controlled territory line was at its
largest in the time of war. In Malaya,
"comfort stations" were
established during the Malayan War. The establishment
of them in Singapore followed, right after
the fall of the city on February
15, 1942.
In the Philippines, a "comfort station" was set up in Iloilo,
Panay Island as early as May 12, 1942. In
Burma they were set up shortly
after the fall of Mandalay on May 1, and
the fall of Myitkyina on May 8.
"Comfort Stations" were also established
at most of other territories
occupied by Japanese military such as
Indonesia, Andaman Islands, Nikobal
Islands, Rabaul, Kavieng, Saipan, Truk
Islands, Palau, Guam, etc.6 In those
occupied territories, Japanese women and
Korean, Taiwanese and Chinese women
taken from colonised territories were
brought for the establishment. Local
women were also put in there, as well as
suffering conventional rape.
6. As indicated in the above, the time of
the FirstShanghai Incident was the
first period, and the way the Japanese
military increased the number of
"comfort stations" and expanded
systematic collection of "comfort women",
following the expansion of war front and
the development of the war, as the
"second period" began with the
all-out war against China, then even further
in the "third period" along with
the start of the Asia-Pacific War.
B. Historical background to the system of
"comfort women"
7. Behind the system of "comfort
women" were : a) colonial domination of
Taiwan, Korea and other areas and, b)
development of Japanese system of
licensed sexual slavery and its
introduction to and development in the
colonized areas.
First of all, had there been no Japanese colonial domination, there
would have been no making of such a massive
number of Korean and Taiwanese
women into "comfort women". The victimisation of those women in such a
massive scale was made possible by the
institutional violence that existed at
the time in the forms of: poverty, and
destruction of farming communities and
families, both brought about as a result of
the economic policy of the
colonial rule; maintaining and reorganising
of patriarchy as a convenient
tool of control; such a system of education
which deprived the people of
poorer classes of access to education, and
so on.
8. Secondly, the racism / ethnocentrism,
deeply rooted in the mentality of
the Japanese military and government of the
time, to think that it was not
favourable to have Japanese women as
"comfort women" but it was all right to
make women of the colonies as such, also
contributed.
9. Thirdly, the modern Japanese system of
licensed sexual slavery was a
product of re-organization in the Meiji
period of its antecedent. It took the
European system as a model, but not exactly
followed it. The Japanese women
of the proletariate / unpropertied class
were gradually integrated into the
system. [translator*s note: It was a system
where girls and young women were
traded, bound by debts and lived within
brothels or such quarters. The
introduction of the modern licensing
system, one may argue, gave an
impression in practice that such things as
the trafficking of young girls and
women and debt bondage were not forbidden,
although they were by law.]
As the state and military of Japan’s Emperor system pushed its
aggression and colonization over Asia
including Korea, Taiwan, "Manchuguo"
etc., this Japanese system of licensed
sexual slavery was also transplanted
into those areas, and the local women in
those areas were knitted into the
bottom of the system. During the course of
this development, the transborder
routes for trafficking of women were
established. In the background of the
invention itself of the "comfort
women" system was the existence of this
already established Japanese system of
licensed sexual slavery, a very
organized system for sexual exploitation of
women, as described above.
II. CHAIN OF COMMAND OF THE JAPANESE
GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY
A.. From the first Shanghai Incident in
early 1932 to the outbreak of the
Asia-Pacific War (WW2) in December 1941
10. During this period the Japanese
Military established many "comfort
stations" in war zones and occupied
territories in China (including
north-eastern China). Expeditionary Army
Headquarters, divisional, regimental
and battalion commanders and so on decided
to set them up and ordered that
women be recruited. The rear staff officers
and adjutant of the unit at each
level drew up concrete plans and
comptroller divisions or others implemented
them. Some of the major examples are as
follows:
a.
In March 1932, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army established a "comfort
station" in Shanghai. Deputy Chief of
Staff OKAMURA Yasuji and Adjutant
General OKABE Naosaburo formulated a plan,
and Staff Officer NAGAMI Toshinori
implemented it.8 For this case, General SHIRAKAWA Yoshinori,
Commander of
the Shanghai Expeditionary Army should also
be held responsible.
b.
In December 1937, the Central China Area Army issued directions
concerning the establishment of a military
"comfort station". According to
these directions, the Second Section of the
General Staff of the Shanghai
Expeditionary Army made a draft plan and
Staff Officer CHO Isamu and others
were in charge of setting up the comfort
station.9 The responsibility for
this case is shared by General MATSUI
Iwane, Commander of the Central China
Area Army.
c.
In June 1938, Lieutenant-General OKABE Naosaburo, Chief of Staff of the
North China Area Army, directed the units
stationed in North China to set up
"comfort stations".10 The
responsibility for this case also lies with General
TERAUCHI Hisaichi, Commander of the North
China Area Army.
d.
In May 1939, 21st Army that had occupied
southern parts of China tried
to increase comfort women under their control
to 1,400 through 1,600.11 The
responsibility for this case also lies with
Lieutenant-General ANDO Rikichi,
Commander of the 21st Army.
11. In recruiting women from local
residents in China, accounting officers,
military policemen and others were in
charge of this task. They “entrusted”
the puppet government or municipal
governors with the recruitment of local
women. In this case, the word “entrust”
virtually meant to order. Some of
the major examples are as follows:
e.
In December 1937, Lieutenant-Colonel TERADA Masao, Staff Officer of the
10th Army, directed military policemen to
recruit Chinese women and set up a
"comfort station" in
Huzhou.12 The responsibility for this
case also lies
with Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA Heisuke,
Commander of the 10th Army.
f.
In August 1940, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Independent Mountain
Artillery Regiment, which was stationed in
a village in Hubei Province,
“entrusted” the
village mayor with the recruitment of women.13
Forcibly
recruited women burst out crying when they
were made to undergo a venereal
inspection. The medical officer wrote in
his diary that "they might have
unwillingly come here probably because they
were finally persuaded [by an
influential man of the village] that their
recruitment would help save the
village."14 The responsibility for this act must go to
Colonel HARADA
Tsurukichi, Commander of the 2nd
Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment.
12. When recruiting "comfort
women" in Korea, Taiwan and Japan, the Japanese
military forces in China either selected
civilian agents and sent them to
recruit women, or asked the
Governments-General of Korea and Taiwan, and the
Home Ministry to do so.
g.
As to the former recruitment procedure, the War Ministry approved it.15
h.
With regard to the latter procedure, there is a clear example of
recruitment in Japan. In November 1938, the
21st Army headquarters decided to
establish "comfort stations" in
the southern part of China. Then the Army
entrusted that task to the Home Ministry,
which directed the police
authorities of five prefectures to select
civilian agents to recruit 400
women.16 It is Major KUMON Arifumi, Staff
Officer of the 21st Army, and
Colonel KOMATSU Mitsuhiko, Recruitment
Section Chief of the War Ministry’s
Personnel Bureau, that asked the Home
Ministry to recruit "comfort women".
Within the Home Ministry, Police Bureau
Chief HONMA Kiyoshi gave directions
to prefectural governors. Moreover, the
21st Army also requested the
Government-General of Taiwan, which
recruited 300 women.17 The responsibility
for this case goes to Lieutenant-General
Ando Rikichi, Commander of the 21st
Army, War Minister ITAGAKI Seishiro,
Lieutenant-General, Home Minister and
Admiral SUETSUGU Nobumasa, and KOBAYASHI
Seizo, the Governor-General of
Taiwan.
These casese above indicate that, in Korea and Taiwan, the
Governments-Generals used civilian
recruiters and kept them under their own
control under cover .
13. i. In July 1941, the Japanese Army drew
up a plan for invading the Soviet
Union
and tried to place forces of about 800,000
in "Manchuguo" near the Soviet
border under the name of the Kwantung Army
Special Exercise.
These operations were cancelled in
September 1941. However, the Kwantung
Army, which had promoted the operations, is
said to have tried to recruit 20,
000 women through the Korean
Government-General.18 Though only about
3,000
women were actually recruited, the
responsibility for this case would go to
Lieutenant-General UMEZU Yoshijiro,
Commander of the Kwantung Army, and
Korean Governor-General MINAMI Jiro.
B. From the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific
War to the defeat of Japan
14. In this period, the core organs of the
Japanese Military came to control
the establishment of "comfort
stations" and the recruitment of the women.
With regard to the Army, the War Ministry’s
Adjutant-general Section, Awards
Section and others were in charge.19
Concerning the Navy, the Navy Ministry’
s Naval Affairs Bureau and Naval
Preparations Bureau were in charge.20 This
means that even in Korea and Taiwan, it
became common to recruit women
through headquarters of Korea Army and
Taiwan Army (area armies), not through
the Governments-General. The following
cases indicate this fact.
j.
In 1942, the Southern Expeditionary Army that occupied vast areas of
Southeast Asia and the Pacific Region were
setting up "comfort stations" in
various places. For example, in order to
set them up in Borneo, the Southern
Expeditionary Army Headquarters asked the
Taiwan Army Headquarters through
the War Ministry to recruit 50 women. Under
the directions of the War
Minister, the Taiwan Army selected three
civilian brokers and made them
recruit 50 women. Then the Taiwan Army
Headquarters asked the War Minister’s
approval for these brokers and women to
travel to Borneo, and got the
permission from the adjutant of the War
Minister.21 The responsibility for
this case goes to General TERAUCHI
Hisaichi, Commander of the Southern
Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant-General ANDO
Rikichi, Commander of the Taiwan
Army, and General TOJO Hideki, War
Minister, who was also the Prime Minister.
Given these facts, it can be said that the responsibility of the
Japanese
Military, especially its core organs,
became heavier after 1942.
Reference : chart of the Japanese Army's
Chain of Command for Expeditionary
Armies in 1942 [see affidavit]
[the following notes are for the chart]
Note 1: China Expeditionary Army was set up
in September 1939, with the
former Expeditionary Army for Central China
at the core, and with the former
Northern China Army (Beijing) and the
former 23rd Army (Guangzhou) also under
its command.
Note 2: Each Expeditionary Army came under
direct jurisdiction and supreme
command of the emperor. The Chief of Staff
issued military commands, and the
War Minister administrative orders, which
were within their assigned
discretion. The matters regarding military
"comfort women" were dealt with by
the Staff of each Expeditionary Army
(especially staff in rear).
[source: YOSHIMI Yoshiaki and HAYASHI
Hirofumi 1995 (eds.) Collaborative
Research: Japanese Military Comfort Women.
Otsuki Shoten, Tokyo]
C. During the period of the all-out war
between Japan and China 1937-45
15. In the case of the Army, the War
Ministry’s Military Administration
Bureau and Medical Affairs Bureau were
involved in the establishment and
management of "comfort stations".
The former was required to maintain
military discipline and morale and the
latter to prevent the spread of
venereal disease. The War Ministry's
Intendance Bureau and the Army
Quartermaster Depot were also involved in
providing condoms and preventive
medicine. 23
16. The "comfort station" system
was nothing but military sexual slavery.
Nevertheless, the Japanese Military, from
top officers to the lowest ranks,
did not oppose this system. They went on
establishing them one after another.
The directions for establishing
"comfort stations" were issued, but there
were no orders issued to abolish them,
except in the few cases with the war
situation growing very badly and in the
case in Semarang, Indonesia (in which
Dutch women were made "comfort
women").
17. "Comfort stations" were
established against the following background.
Soldiers in war zones were put in extremely
poor living conditions and
abused. They were completely deprived of
their human rights. As a result,
their repressed emotions often exploded
against local residents in war zones
and occupied areas, which typically took
the form of violence against women
and rape. Such explosion of violence to an
extraordinary level was commonly
seen in areas occupied by the Japanese
Military, including China, the
Philippines and Indonesia in particular.
The core parts of the Japanese
Military, though knowing these facts, did
not take active measures to prevent
such crimes. The provisions of the Criminal
Code of the Army applied to rape
only when done along with looting, before
it was amended in 1942.24 Also,
there were so few military police personnel
that cases of rape were rarely
taken up. Even when case of rape were
uncovered, the regular Criminal Code,
rather than that of the Army, was applied
to most of them. As rape was an
offence subject to prosecution only upon
complaint in the regular Criminal
Code, it was not exceptional for the
soldier who committed rape to kill his
victim so as not to be prosecuted.
18. Rather, the Japanese military forces
tolerated soldiers’ violent
behaviour against women in war zones and
occupied areas so that their
repressed emotions and indignation might
not explode at superiors. In some
cases, the officers even induced soldiers
to practice violence on female
residents.25
19. Note: The total number of the women
victims put to military sexual
slavery (including Korean, Chinese,
Taiwanese, Filipino, Indonesian, Japanese
and other women) is extremely difficult to
obtain. The effort to obtain very
rough estimates demonstrated by Dr. YOSHIMI
Yoshiaki is as follows:
a. Minimum
1) The Army had a standard of access to one
"comfort woman" for every hundred
soldiers to be provided by the Army.
2) The total number of military personnel
overseas (both Navy and Army)
was about 3,500,000 at the largest. The
forces at the utmost forefront were
not very
often with such women, and even the forces
elsewhere were not necessarily
with
them. So the total number of soldiers can
be set at 3,000,000 as a base for
calculation.
3) It is hard to know the alternation rate
of "comfort women", but let us
tentatively call it at 1.5. Then:
3,000,000÷100 X 1.5 = 45,000
If we add the estimate number of women that
was not grasped by the core of
the military, headquarters of armies and
area armies, the estimation will be
about 5,000,000. This would be the minimum.
b. maximum
1) There was another standard, which was seen
by brokers and proprietors in
sex
trade of the time as the ideal ratio for
brothels, of one woman per thirty
men
[potential clients]. This is a rather
unrealistic ratio for this case.
2) Let us increase the rate of alternation
to 2, though this is rather an
unrealistic estimation. Then:
3,000,000 ÷30 X 2 = 200,000
This would be a clue to the maximum.
When the number of those women who
were held and subjected to multiple rape
for a period of time [but not within the
establishment of "comfort stations"]
is taken into account, the minimum would be
much bigger than the 50,000, as
stated above.
[Please note that the total number of the
women victims put to military
sexual slavery is yet to be estimated,
presenting reasonable grounds to the
calculation.]
III. INDIVIDUAL CHARGES
A. Sexual enslavement "UEDA Yoko"
(an assumed name) and other Japanese
"comfort women"
Defendants:
USHIJIMA Mitsuru (Commander of the 32nd
Army),
HONGO Yoshio (Commander of the 62nd
Division),
CHO Isami (Chief of Staff of the 32nd Army)
20. From at least August 1944 to June 1945,
Defendant USHIJIMA Mitsuru served
as Commander of the 32nd Army posted in
Okinawa, and Defendant HONGO Yoshio
as Commander of the 62nd Division (Ishi
Corps) under the 32nd Army. Around
the summer 1944, these Defendants, in
collusion with each other, made an
adjutant of a certain unit make a request
to the Naha Police Station for
permission for establishing "comfort
stations", and made the adjutant order
the managment office Tsuji Yukaku [quarter
of licensed brothels] in the city
of Naha [Naha is the main city of the
islands of Okinawa] to conscript
*juris* [*juri* is a local blanket term for
the women who are professional
entertainers but also provide sexual
service at times, and the women who are
regular licensed prostitutes] who were at
work in the Tsuji quarters. Through
such means including the above, they made
approximately 500 *juris* from the
Tsuji quarters work as "comfort
women" [for the military] in a total of
fifteen "comfort stations", thus
sexually enslaving them including UEDA Yoko
(an assumed name), who was made a
"comfort woman" at a "comfort station" set
up at the 27th field water purification
unit.
21. Defendant CHO Isami served as Chief of
Staff of the 32nd Army posted in
Okinawa at least from August 1944 to June
1945. After the U.S. military
landing on the Okinawan Main Island on
April 1st, 1945, he made between ten
and twenty *geishas* [professional
entertainers] and between ten and twenty
*juris* put in the cave where the core part
of the headquarters of the 32nd
Army stayed in the city of Shuri, gave the order that these women were made
to work as "comfort women"
exclusively for officers of the core part of the
said headquarters, and by doing so sexually
enslaving these women.
22. Immediately after the aforementioned
adjutant ordered the management
office of the Tsuji quarters, Naha, to
conscript the *juris* there as
"comfort women", a great number
of these women rushed to Naha Police Station
to ask permission to give up their license
[i.e. retire from prostitution].
This fact shows clearly that there was
a fundamental difference between
being engaged in prostitution and being
made sex slaves as "comfort women",
and that those women who accepted becoming
prostitutes firmly rejected
becoming "comfort women". It
demonstrates clearly that a woman who had been
working in a brothel was in fact a victim
of the crime of sexual enslavement
[, once she was made a "comfort
woman" ].
B. Sexual enslavement of "SAWADA
Noriko" (an assumed name) and other Japanese
"comfort women"
Defendants:
KOBAYASHI Seizou (Governor General of
Taiwan),
KONDO Nobutake (Commander General of the
5th Fleet),
ANDO Rikichi (Commander of the 21st Army),
KATO Kyohei (President of Taiwan
Colonization Company),
MORIOKA Jiro (Director-General of
Government-General of Taiwan),
ARITA Hachiro (Foreign Minister of HIRANUMA
Kiichiro Cabinet)
23. At the time of the Japanese Army's
invasion and occupation of Hainan
Island in
February 1939, Defendant KONDO Nobutake served as Commander
General of the 5th Fleet of the Japanese
Navy, ANDO Rikichi as Commander of
the 21st Army of the Japanese Army, and
ARITA Hachiro as Foreign Minister of
HIRANUMA Kiichiro Cabinet. In February 1939,
when these three Defendants made
the representatives of the three ministries
of the War, Navy and Foreign
Affairs hold a joint three-ministry meeting
and drow up occupation policy
plans for Hainan Island, the three planned,
in collusion with each other, to
establish "comfort stations" as a
part of the occupation policy. In March
1939 they made Chief of the Intelligence
Bureau of the Navy in Haikou, where
the headquarter of the 5th Fleet was, to
ask the Taiwan Colonization Company,
whose president was Defendant KATO Kyohei,
to build "comfort stations". By
doing the above, the first three Defendants
made the critical decision for
sexually enslaving a big number of women
including Victim SAWADA Noriko (an
assumed name), then, through the said Taiwan
Colonization Company*s actual
building so many "comfort
stations" within Hainan Island, in response to
their request, sexually enslaved the many women including the said
Victim
SAWADA.
24. Around April 1939, Defendant KATO
Kyohei as President of Taiwan
Colonization Company, in collusion with
KOBAYASHI Seizo, Governor General of
Taiwan, and MORIOKA Jiro, Director General
of Government General of Taiwan,
transported to "comfort stations"
in Haikou "specially required personnel" (3
managers, 4 *geigis*
[entertainer-prostitutes], 7 *shakufus*
[waitress-prostitutes], 2 waitresses, 1
cook, and 2 odd-job persons)
including the said Victim SAWADA Noriko,
thus sexually enslaving at least the
11 women including SAWADA.
25. For the leaders of the Japanese
military and government, not only it was
important to prevent fuelling the
anti-Japanese sentiment through frequent
occurrence of rape, prevent the decay of
war capacity through transmission of
venereal diseases, to improve the morale by
soldiers* discharging the stress,
to prevent information leaks through
intimate exchanges of the soldiers and
local women and so on, as stated earlier,
but it was also crucial to prevent
"daughters of good families"
among Japanese women become "comfort women" and
to acquire a significant supply of women as
the source of the supply of
healthy Japanese boys as future soldiers of
the imperial military (often
referred to as "*sekishi* to the
emperor"). The cases of licensed prostitutes
to be conscripted as "comfort women"
was one of the most typical cases of
Japanese women to be subjected to long-term
and repetitive sexual violence as
such. The other typical patterns include
the women [girls] of poor mountain
or farming communities being sold to pimps
or proprietors, and the women,
again of the poor strata, being made
"comfort women" through deception such
as being told that they would "tend to
the need of the Japanese soldiers" or
be given a job as a typist, etc. Those
Japanese women with the experience in
prostitution or of the poor strata were, to
the eyes of the leaders of the
Japanese military and government, mainly
the potential source of pleasure,
rather than to play the role of "the
sex to give birth". Therefore, in the
similar way as any woman of a belligerent
or occupied State was a potential
victim of wartime sexual violence by the
Japanese military, the Japanese
women with the experience in prostitution
or of the poor strata were
potential victims of wartime sexual
violence by the military of their own
country.
C. Sexual enslavement of the women in areas
other than the six victimised
countries or regions represented at the
present Tribunal
26. The Japanese Army set up comfort
stations at nearly all areas under
Japanese occupation. According to numerous
documents, Japanese "comfort
stations" were established in
Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand,
India (Andaman and Nicobar Islands), Papua
New Guinea, Guam (USA), Micronesia
and other Pacific islands in addition to
the six countries and regions
represented at the present Tribunal . It is
likely that there were also
comfort stations in Laos and Cambodia,
although this has not yet been
confirmed. Dutch and Eurasians were also
forced to be "comfort women". All
the above-mentioned areas were invaded and
occupied by the Southern
Expeditionary Army. 26
27. As for Vietnam, immediately after the
Japanese occupied the northern part
of Indochina in September 1940, Lieutenant
General NISHIMURA Takuma,
Commander of the Indochina Expeditionary
Army, discussed with his Chief of
Staff on the matter of setting up
"comfort stations" as soon as possible. It
seems that Vietnam was the first place in
South-east Asia where a "comfort
station" was established.
28. After the breakout of the Asia-Pacific
War, "comfort stations" were
established in Alorstar, Malaya in December
1941, in Hat Yai and Singora,
Thailand in January 1942, and in addition,
in Singapore after the Japanese
occupation in February 1942. It has been
confirmed so far that "comfort
stations" were in operation in at
least in 24 cities in Malay Peninsula. In
Kuala Lumpur alone, there were sixteen
"comfort stations" in seven different
areas. The majority of "comfort
women" in Kuala Lumpur were Chinese residents
of Malaya, followed by Koreans, Thais,
Javanese, Indians and mixed
Malay-Chinese.
29. In March, 1942, in Kuala Pilah, a town
in Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia, the
Japanese garrison commander ordered the
leader of the town to recruit women.
The leader recruited eighteen Chinese women
and handed them over the Japanese
garrison. While recruitment in this area
was in progress the Japanese army
was conducting a clean-up operation,
massacring large numbers of natives they
regarded as anti-Japanese elements.
30. According to the testimony of a woman
(identity closed) who was then a
girl of sixteen, living in a suburb of
Kuala Lumpur, Japanese soldiers forced
their way into her house and carried her
off, along with her brother. While
her brother never came back, she was repeatedly
gang-raped and then forced to
become a "comfort woman".
31. Several recruitment methods were
employed in South-east Asia; such as
ordering local leaders to recruit women,
forcible abduction (especially
common in the Philippines), recruitment by
fraud on the pretext of offering
jobs as office girls, nurses and so on. In
the early stages of the war, while
Quartermaster Corps were in charge of
establishing "comfort stations",
individual troop units also set up
"comfort stations" of their own. The
military administration later took charge
of them.
32. In Indonesia, the Japanese army picked
up two or three hundred young
Dutch women from internee camps and forced
them to become "comfort women". In
Palembang, Sumatra, the army tried to intemidate
thirty-two Australian nurses
into becoming "comfort women" for
Japanese officers but they refused. After
they registered their complaints with the
Red Cross, Japanese intimidation
ceased.27
Although the Japanese army at least made a show of trying to
obtain the consent of the Dutch and
Australian women (though these efforts
often took the form of fraud or deception),
in the case of Asian women
"consent" was not an issue.
33. It is likely that the majority of
"comfort women" for the Japanese
military in South-east Asia and the Pacific
areas were local women. In
addition, not a few women were kept as
mistresses by Japanese officers. With
the exception of the Philippines and
Indonesia, where there are organizations
supporting former "comfort women",
throughout South-east Asia former "comfort
women" are still neglected, unable to
come forth. Their physical and mental
suffering must be extremely grave beyond
one*s imagination.
[end of 1st half, jp indictment]
D. Charges against Defendant Hirohito,
Emperor Showa
34. Defendant Hirohito, Emperor Showa
Defendant Hirohito, Emperor Showa:
1) was the head of the Empire of Japan,
exercised the prerogatives as a
sovereign (Article 4 of the Constitution of
the Empire of Japan), had the
supreme command of the Army and Navy
(Article 11), and was in a position of
the commander-in-chief of the Japanese
military since his coronatoin in 1926
until Japan's defeat in August 1945;
2) led the war and war strategies based on
the information supplied to him by
the military and on his own strategic
judgments since around 1931 when the
so-called Fifteen-Year War began;
3) particularly upon the February 26
Incident of 1936, occurred in the year
after the "Clarification of the
Japanese Body Politic Movement" (the
so-called The-Emperor-as-an-Organ Theory
Incident) of 1935, encouraged and
urged the hesitant Army leadership to
suppress the Incident, thereby
enhancing his authority as the supreme
commander and;
4) involved himself actively as the supreme
commander in the development of
the all-out war against China (the Marco
Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, the
expansion of war zones into Shanghai in the
same year, the establishment of
the Imperial Military Headquarters in
November of the same year, the
occupation of Nanjing in December) and in
the process of the war against the
United States and the United Kingdom after
December 8, 1941, and he was in a
position to order the Navy and Army' High
Commands and the Imperial Military
Headquarters to make sure that these
commanding organs issue the Japanese
Military strategic orders that would abide
by international law.
a. Liability for the Rape of Nanking
[Facts and Applicable Laws]
35. During the period from December 1937 to
around February 1938, in the City
of Nanking, serving as the
commander-in-chief of the Japanese Army in the war
against China, Defendant H, in the capacity
stated as above and such,
neglected his duty as the
commander-in-chief who should control the behavior
of the rank and file of the troops, letting
the soldiers who fought the
Battle of Nanking, which he commanded, rape
the civilian Chinese women on a
mass-scale and during a long period,
repeatedly and incessantly, killed many
of these women after raping them, and those
women who barely survived the
killings to still have wounds on their
sexual organs, and scars on other
parts of the body from attempting to resist
the rape, and PTSD that is left
incurable to this day, besides letting the
Japanese soldiers massacre tens of
thousands of civilian Chinese people, and
commit serious crimes such as
setting these Chinese civilians' residences
and properties on fire and
ruthlessly looting them. Therefore, Defendant H committed crimes
against
humanity.
[Prosecutor's Allegation]
36. The Nanking Atrocities that included
the raping of a vast number of
civilian Chinese women described above
covered a large area and lasted for a
long period of time, were committed
repeatedly and relentlessly, and were
indeed a series of seriously criminal
behaviors which appalled the world.
Therefore, if Defendant H, in the capacity
stated as above and such, made any
kind of effort to meet his responsibility
as the commander-in-chief, then he
must have been able to be informed of these
behaviors either through briefing
by his military staffs or members of the
imperial family, news reports, or by
accounts from the Imperial headquarters
which were informed by European or
American journalists' reports of the Rape
of Nanking to the world media
sources. Defendant H neglected his
responsibility even though he had the duty
to control the soldiers who participated in
the Battle of Nanking in the
troops he was commanding, and to prevent
them from violating the laws of war
by committing such crimes as rape of
civilian women in a large area for a
long period of time, repeatedly and
consecutively, massacre of tens of
thousands of civilian Chinese people, and
setting these Chinese civilians'
residences and properties on fire,
ruthlessly looting them. Therefore, his
neglect of such a duty is against
international law, according to the
"principle of commander's
responsibility" established after the "Yamashita
Case" in the Manila Military Tribunal
of the United States Military
Commission.
b. Liability for cases of "comfort
stations"
[Facts and Applicable Laws]
37. During Japan's war against China and
against the Allied Powers, the
Commander-in-Chief of Japan (H) neglected
his duty to control the behaviors
and operations of rank and file of troops,
enabling the making of a vast
number of women from Korea, Taiwan, China,
the Philippines and Indonesia into
sex slaves for Japanese officers and
soldiers, putting these women in the
"comfort stations" that were set
up over extremely vast areas that are shown
in the attached table and map (the
so-called "comfort stations" map) in the
Asia-Pacific region during the period from
at the latest around 1932 during
the First Shanghai Incident to Japan's
defeat in August 1945 (in Taiwan, till
the end of that year). Therefore, Defendant H committed crimes
against
humanity.
[Prosecutor's Allegation]
38. The so-called "comfort
stations" were first set up in order to prevent
the anti-Japanese sentiments in China from
aggravating further because of the
Japanese soldiers' rampant raping of
Chinese women at the time of the First
Shanghai Incident in 1932 and then grew
into full-scale upon all-out invasion
into China in 1937. And given the large
scale of expansion of battle zones of
this war of aggression, and its areal
vastness and systematic nature
manifested in the fact that "comfort
stations" were set up even in the very
forefront battle lines in the Asia-Pacific
region, it would have been
impossible for the military leadership to
fail to notice the existence of the
"comfort stations." In fact, Defendant H's second younger brother
Prince
Takamatsunomiya noted of "comfort
women" in his diary. The Defendant himself
spoke of deterioration of military
disciplines in the face of the
prolongation of war, and problems with
keeping the public peace and order.
Therefore, we can assume his knowledge of
"facilities for sexual comfort"
that were the main theme of the measures
taken against these problems.
39. Given the above-stated vastness and
speed of expansion of battle zones in
the war of aggression, and also considering
how to set up "comfort stations"
at every single depot (supply stations) of
the very forefront battle lines in
the whole Asia-Pacific region up until the
end of the war in 1945, it would
have been easy for Defendant H to
understand that women had to be recruited
by force, coercion, threat, deception
and/or allurement, and that the
collected women would be forced to have
sexual intercourse with a large
number of soldiers day after day, and that
the women would be forced to be
transported along with the troops and
military supplies whenever the
battlelines moved around, and that in other
words, the actual situation of
"comfort stations" would be
nothing but a sexual slavery system that was
against the international humanitarian law,
if Defendant H made any kind of
effort to meet his responsibility as the
supreme commander.
40. However, it was either that Defendant H
neglected his duty to learn about
the actual situation of "comfort stations"
that was nothing but sexual
slavery which violated international
humanitarian law, or that Defendant H
had realized that the "comfort
stations" would be a sexual slavery system in
and of itself which was against
international humanitarian law, but thought
he had no choice other than setting up the
comfort stations in order to
prevent the already-strong anti-Japanese
sentiments from aggravating further,
to protect soldiers' physical fighting
capacity against venereal diseases, to
boost soldiers' morale by securing outlets
for their stress and repression,
to prevent vital information from leaking
through soldiers' and officers'
personal/private interaction with local
women of enemy countries. In either
case, he neglected his duty to stop the
Army or the civilian brokers from
recruiting the women by force, coercion,
threat, deception and/or allurement,
letting a vast number of these women be
made into "comfort women," i.e., into
sexual slaves in the whole region of
Asia-Pacific until Japan's defeat in
1945, and upon the end of the war, although
he was responsible for these
women's return to their homes, he abandoned
them.
41. Given his spiritual positioning that
equaled to that of "a god" vis-a-vis
Japanese soldiers, had he decided to abolish
the "comfort stations," it would
have been possible to eradicate the sexual
slavery system. And given the
depth and magnitude of the human rights
violation which the victimized women
experienced, and the grave consequences
thereof, Defendant H's neglect of his
duty to stop the Army to recruit the women
by force, coercion, threat,
deception and/or allurement holds
significant illegality in reference to
international law.
Table: "List of Comfort Stations"
(Contents omitted here)
China
Taiwan
The Philippines
Indonesia
Malaysia
Burma
Vietnam
Indian Andaman Islands, Nikobal Islands
Papua New Guinea (Rabaul, Kabien) and other
islands in the Pacific
Saipan, Truk, Palau in the South Pacific
and American Guam
Okinawa
Japan
see also: the so-called map of
"comfort stations"
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE STATE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
A. Insufficiency of investigation and
disclosure of the truth
42. On August 15, 1945, the Japanese
government accepted the Potsdam
Declaration and made unconditional
surrender. Article 11 of the Declaration
provided the prosecution of war criminals.
Around this time, many official
government and military documents were
burned by a decision of the Cabinet.
The Army Staff and the War Ministry sent a
note to all army units ordering
them to destroy all confidential documents.
They even pressured the House of
Representatives and newspaper companies to
destroy records of confidential
meetings and photographs of prisoners of
war. The similar order was
dispatched within the Navy. The Home Ministry also decided to burn
official
documents. HARA Bunbei (he became a
chairperson of the House of Councilors
and the chief trustee of the Asian Women's
Fund), OKUNO Seiryou (he later
became a member of the House of
Representatives, Minister of Education,
and
Minister of Home Affairs), and KOBAYASHI
Yosaji (he later became Vice
Minister of Home Affairs and the president
of the Yomiuri newspaper) all
shared the responsibility of notifying
local governments and police
departments of this order. These facts show clearly that those actors
were
thinking about the war crime tribunals that
would be held after the war, and
that they burned documents in order to
destroy the evidence of war crimes
they had committed. Such conducts of theirs hiding or destroying
documents
in relation to war crimes may well
constitute violations of international
obligation that Japan accepted by its
surrender.(see expert opinion by
Yoshida.)
43. For a long time after the war, the
Japanese government had long made no
effort to investigate or even acknowledged
the existence of the so-called
"comfort women," the "731
Military Unit" and so on. To this
day, it denies
even the existence of basic official
documents regarding the "731 Military
Unit". In 1992, the Japanese
government at last promised to investigate the
issue of "comfort women" as a
result of being pressured by the international
community. However, the first report of
this investigation denied the
Japanese government's involvement in the
matter. In August 1992, in the
second report, the Japanese government
finally admitted the involvement of
the military and the government and police,
and that there was coercion in
recruiting and using of the women.
However, both these reports were very vague about the roles that the
government and military had played. At the
time of investigation for these
reports, the Japanese government did not
look at certain archives saying that
there were no related documents. But at the
archives at the Police, the
Ministry of Welfare and the pre-war Supreme
Court, which were amongst those
archives that the government had not
looked, later some important documents
related to "comfort women" issues
were found. These documents were discovered
by non-officials and by accident. Even
today, the Japanese government does
not show interest in finding truth of this
issue. But many academics and
others are
certain that at places including the Archives of the Institute of
Defence, Defence Agency, must still be many
relevant documents that have not
been disclosed or even organized.
B. Non-fulfilment of duties for apology,
reparation, or prosecution
44. The Japanese government has purposely
used a discourse of falsehood and
distortion, which openly denies the
victims' status. These acts have been
done repeatedly and continuously, and have
hurt the self-esteem of many
survivors and others. Not only the facts
were denied, but also, comments and
policy made by the Japanese government officials
against the legal status and
rights of the victims -- all of which have
constantly hurt the survivors
deeply. In particular, these officials keep
to the technical defence, and
ignore its duty to prosecute and punish war
criminals and to provide the
victims with reparation. They have also
tried to force the victims to accept
the "resolution" through a
"private fund" (the Asian Women*s Fund,
established by the government in August
1995). A response to the survivors
through a "private fund" can be a
way to meet the moral responsibility of the
State, but cannot be accepted as an
appropreate way to meet the legal
responsibility of the State. The legal
responsibility the Japanese government
must fulfil still remains. The
"defence of international agreements", the
main ground for the Japanese government to
argue that it has no legal
responsibility in the issue of
"comfort women", is in fact groundless for the
following reasons:
45. First, Japan has a duty to prosecute
and punish crimes prohibited under
international law, but keeps neglecting to
fulfil the duty. There is no such
bilateral or multilateral agreement that
might remove this duty from Japan.
Therefore, none of the international
agreement or treaty that Japan has
ratified is a defence for Japan to say that
the issue of duty for punishment
has already been settled through
international agreements. This duty is
not
subject to a statute of limitations. When a
State is in breach of this duty,
then it is liable to pay compensation. Therefore,
Japan is liable to provide
the "comfort women" survivors
with compensation to make up for the damage
suffered by them due to its failure to duly
prosecute and punish war
criminals.
46. Second, in 1972, when Japan settled the
peace issue with China, Japan
agreed to the condition that China does not
waive the claims of its
nationals. Therefore, regardless of Article
14 (b) of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty, Article 26 of the same treaty is
applied and one must understand that
no claims of an individual victim are
waived for those who are national to
any country that is a party to the San
Francisco Peace Treaty. Japan cannot
claim that the issue of compensation to
individual victims has been settled
by international agreements in this way.
C. Leaving the PTSD of the victimise
persons to grow worse
47. The victims who had been put in
“comfort stations” or "rape centres"
have suffered physical and psychological
pain which is different from the
other war crimes because it comes from
sexual violence. They had been
confined to particular places and raped
constantly by many soldiers for a
long period of time. Constant sexual
violence brought them so grave physical
injuries that many of them were died of
illness at the time. The survivors
have also undergone vast range of illnesses
including venereal diseases,
sterility and different kinds of ill health
including palpitation, headache,
physical pain of different parts of the
body, gastroenteric trouble, etc.
48. An experience of a grave event, the
pain and agony of which brings is so
serious to overcome, remains with the
person after the event as trauma and
often causes PTSD(post-traumatic
syndromes). Many cases of suicide or
mental
trouble under the confinement are reported
by the survivors of the “comfort
women” and they themselves show serious
PTSD. Survivors themselves report
their symptoms and examples of such reports
are found in various sources
including the testimonies made by the women
survivors themselves, the
descriptions in the indictments for and
examinations of plaintiff at court
hearings of various civil lawsuits in which
the survivors are suing the
Japanese government, the testimonies at
different occasions including for the
United Nations Human Rights mechanisms, and
at international public hearings.
34
The medical diagnoses of thirty plaintiffs of the lawsuit of the Filipino
women by Christine R. GATES,35 of two of
them by MITSUHASHI Junko,36 and six
plaintiffs of the case of China's Shanxi
Province by KUWAYAMA Norihiko,37
they manifest how serious the survivors’
symptoms are. Many women raped
violently in their teens, which can be also
considered in respect of child
abuse, and they have suffered strong fear
and insomnia, fright, or depressed
state until today even after over fifty
years.
49. The psychiatrists who diagnosed the
women point out that it is taking
very long a time for them to recover from
PTSD. The patriarchal social system
lies in the background to their obstructed
recovery. In a patriarchal society
where being made subject to sexual violence
is thought to be the shame of the
family or clan as well as the victim
herself, she is branded an “impure” or
"dirty" woman. She is, therefore,
unable to speak out of her injury, is
deprived of her own rights to self-esteem
and to seek for happiness, and
obliged to be keep silent with pain and
agony, without any care and support
of the people around her. One of the
diagnoses points out that the victims?
PTSD may have influence on the next
generation as some of the victims may
hurt themselves and their children with
sudden violence as a result of her
grave trauma.38
Consequently, for the victims to recover from such serious mental and
emotional wounds, providing them with an environment the safety
of which
they can rely on, to speak about their
experiences, sincere apologies and
compensation from their perpetrators,
prosecution and punishment of the
perpetrators are crucial. The Japanese
government has, however, never tried
to meet the cries of the survivors,
consistently denied its own legal
responsibility, never put serious efforts
to fact-finding and disclosure of
the truth or providing proper redress to
victims, and ignored their PTSD. The
psychological injury of the survivors has thus multiplied, and the PTSD
has
been continuing.
V. FACTUAL GROUND TO THE STATE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
50. Until the end of WW2 or the
Asia-Pacific War, the defendant H was the
head of the State and supreme commander of
all the Japanese armed forces. In
addition, all of the above-mentioned
defendants were leading members of the
Japanese military or government.
51. Around August 15, 1945, when the
Japanese government accepted
unconditional surrender, Japan tried to
destroy the evidence of war crimes.
The General Staff and the Army Ministry
sent a notification to all army units
to order them to burn all confidential
documents. The Navy issued a similar
order to all naval units. The Home Ministry
also did so to local governments
and the police. These acts made it
impossible or extremely difficult to find
facts and make the truth public.
52. When it was recognized that wartime
sexual violence had neither been duly
prosecuted nor punished in the light of
gender perspective in the Tokyo
Tribunal, the above defendants, including
H, should have been prosecuted as
criminal defendants and properly punished
as promptly as possible in the
Japanese court. (Such a procedure should
have been adopted at least before
they are prosecuted here in the Women’s
International War Crime Tribunal 55
years after the end of the War.) That is,
Japan has continued to neglect the
duty to prosecute and punish the war
criminals until this very day.
53. Many of the survivors of wartime sexual
violence by the Japanese Military
have been suffering from mental
aftereffects known as PTSD (post-traumatic
syndromes). There is a possibility that
these mental aftereffects will be
reduced if the Japanese government
acknowledges the historical facts and its
own legal responsibility for them,
apologizes to the survivors, and takes
relevant compensatory measures. But the
Japanese government has not yet fully
apologized nor taken such measures. As a
matter of fact, the mental
aftereffects the survivors suffer have
become progressively worse. It is
because Japanese government officials and
Diet members have denied or
distorted the historical facts and
repudiated the responsibility of the
Japanese government. It is also because of
what the Japanese government
argues as the defendant in the proceedings
at various Japanese domestic
courts, to which the women survivors have
brought the matter. Moreover, the
decisions of the courts, which are an agent
of the State, have continued to
decline the legal responsibility of the
state of Japan as the defendant.
NAKASONE Yasuhiro, who mentions in his
memoirs his stay in Indonesia during
the war and his involvement in establishing
a "comfort station," became the
Prime Minister of Japan after the war. Even
after the sufferings of "comfort
women" got fairly well-known, he has
never tried to take a step to redress
them. These facts have also made the
victims deeply aware what a different
path the wrongdoers and the victims of
wartime sexual violence have walked
since the end of the war. This has further
injured the victims' feelings.
54. It is the Japanese government that has
caused such trauma to the victims.
Therefore, the Japanese government has an
obligation to detect severe mental
aftereffects they suffer and to strive to
heal or reduce them. Nevertheless,
the Japanese government has neglected these
obligations for more than fifty
years since the end of the war. The
government has not only passed over
severe PTSD the victims suffer, but also
denied, distorted or ignored the
facts of wrongdoing. Moreover, the
government has denied the responsibility
for them and worsened PTSD. Apart from the
responsibility of the State of
Japan that is derived from war crimes
committed by Japanese military officers
and government officials, this neglect of
remedy -- the neglect of the
obligation by a person who should assume an
obligation to remedy -- is
nothing but another illegal act after the
war and also gives a state
responsibility to the Japanese government.
55. Japan is liable to compensate for the
above-mentioned illegal conducts
done by Japanese military officers and
government officials. (Such conducts
naturally constitute a tort because they
constitute a crime.) Nevertheless,
Japan has not yet paid even a penny for
compensation as a part of restitution
to recover from the damage brought by the
illegal act. Now the Asian Women*s
Fund provides money only in exchange for
the negation of the legal
responsibility of the State of Japan for
compensation. Also, a gift of money
out of sympathy has no nature of payment
for compensation. Therefore, the
establishment of this "private"
fund is in no way be understood as that the
responsibility for compensation that the
State of Japan is obliged is duly
fulfilled.
56. As mentioned above, Japan has not
fulfilled obligations to find and
disclose the truth about the past war
crimes and crimes against humanity nor
duties to prosecute and punish those
responsible for such crimes. Given this
fact, it can never be said that Japan has
taken necessary measures to prevent
war crimes and crimes against humanity from
occurring again in the future.
VI. CONTENT OF THE STATE RESPONSIBILITY
THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS TO
FULFIL
57. The responsibility of the State of
Japan that arises on the above grounds
(paras. 50 through 56) is serious and grave
in light of the defendants’
serious infringement on the human rights of
victimized women and the gravity
of the damage as a whole that surpasses all
imagination. Just like the United
States of America, which was judged to be
guilty in the Russell Tribunal for
its involvement as a state in the Vietnam
War, an aggressive war as a crime
against humanity, the State of Japan should
be judged to be guilty for its
aggressive war in the Asia-Pacific region
and the grave damage from sexual
violence during the war.
Now Japan must take up and implement the following measures in order to
fulfil this serious and grave state
responsibility at very long last:
58. Investigate and disclose the truth.
Japan should establish a fact-finding
body to clarify the entire damage from
sexual violence during the aggressive
war, and immediately make open all war
crime-related documents under the
control of the government to help private
citizens’ efforts to find the
truth.
59. Prosecute and punish those who were
responsible. Japanese prosecutors
should prosecute the defendants who still
survive, and the Japanese court
should give them suitable punishment except
death penalty.
60. Legislation for reparation. The
Japanese government should pay victims a
proper amount of reparation as soon as
possible. In order to provide with
compensation as many survivors in as many
areas and as quickly as possible,
legislation for such implementation would
be the most appropriate.
Within Japan already, there are four written drafts for such legislation
already written by different groups. Three
of them are drafted by mainly MPs
and are referred to as the Democratic
Party’s Bill, the Communist Party’s
Bill, and the Social Democrats* Bill. The
other one is referred to as the
Outline for the Bill, drafted by the
practising lawyers of the network of the
panels of lawyers for the survivors in the
post-war reparation cases. The
three above-mentioned bills by the
political parties were officially
submitted, as bills, to the House of
Councilors on 30th of October, 2000. It
is just for the state of Japan to base its
legislation on one of those three
bills if that will bring about the ealier
legislation than otherwise. Amongst
the four bills, the so-called Outline for
the Bill is the best in the way
that it is the only one that reflects the
voices of the survivors themselves,
contacted through various local NGOs
supporting the survivors of wartime
sexual violence on the day-to-day basis.
61. Prevent recurrence and ensure accurate
history education as a minimum
preventative measure. The Japanese
government should take necessary and
sufficient measures to prevent wartime
sexual violence from occurring again
in the future. One of the first things to
be done to prevent the future
repetition of wartime sexual violence is no
doubt to educate children
accordingly in school, so that they will
understand as a crucial part of such
education the gravity of the damage
suffered by the victims of wartime sexual
violence committed in the past, and the
seriousness of the responsibility and
accountability on the part of the
perpetrator. Therefore, to ensure that the
minimum of the educational environment for
such is provided, it is crucial
that there is a clear entry of these things
in the textbooks used at school.
However, according to what media reports, such as in the 10 Sept 2000
issue of Mainichi Shinbun (newspaper), they
have found that the drafts of
history textbooks to be used in primary and
lower secondary [compulsory]
schools throughout the country starting the
schoolyear [fiscal year] 2002,
prepared by eight different publishers,
have greatly decreased their entries
regarding the issue of "military
comfort women" upon application for the
approval of the ministry of education. Only
three out of those eight
publishers included anything regarding the
issue in their drafts, although
previously seven of them used to do
so. And even in those comments that are
included, the angle that Japan was in fact
the perpetrator is weakened
greatly. What should be noted here is that
this change did not take place as
a result of the official suggestion
procedure by the ministry of education,
but had been already made at the time of
application, rather as a result of
what should be referred to as voluntary
self-censorship. This indicates quite
strongly that there may have been some kind
of political pressure placed upon
the textbook publishers by the right wing
and the people who claim to have
the more "liberalist view of
history" or revisionists [translator*s note:
they criticize the post-war history and
education of Japan, that sees the war
until 1945 as Japan’s aggression, as with
the "self-abusive view", and
promote the "more liberal" and
"fairer" view of Japanese history, which
claims that the war was to emancipate the
whole of the Asian region from the
West, which is the same argument the
Japanese right wing make].
The government of Japan in this situation, should provide through the
means of its ministry of education’s
official opinion in the procedure for
official approval of textbooks, with the
textbook publishers, the view that
the gravity of the damage suffered by the
victims of wartime sexual violence
committed in the past, and the seriousness
of the responsibility and
accountability on the part of the
perpetrator should be clearly be a part of
their textbooks, and thus to meet its own
responsibility it has over
education for the future generations .
[end]
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